I. Introduction
The year 2014 marks the 10 th anniversary of the Estonian membership in the European Union 1 . Back in 2004, along with nine other European countries 2 , Estonia has become a 'new' EU Member State, a designation that is now predominantly used when referring to the 2007 entrants -Bulgaria and Romania, and, most recently, to Croatia, which joined the EU in July 2013. The year 2014 also marks a decade in the enforcement of Regulation 1/2003 3 , which has decentralized the enforcement of EU competition rules 1 See generally Estonia's Way into the European Union (Tallinn 2009), available at http:// web-static.vm.ee/static/failid/052/Estonias_way_into_the_EU.pdf (2.05.2014).
2 These include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. by establishing the European Competition Network (hereafter: ECN) 4 . The new system has brought enforcement down from the level of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU to the national competition authorities (hereafter: NCAs) and national courts 5 . Early comments on the decentralization of EU competition law enforcement noted that the success of the reform will depend on the "capacity of the new system to achieve an acceptable degree of consistency in the application of Community competition law throughout the European Union" 6 .
According to the official statistics, the ECN has been informed of 1717 investigations between 1 st May 2004 and 28 th February 2014 7 . In the same period of time, 721 envisaged decisions were submitted by the NCAs to the ECN 8 . This statistics demonstrates that the NCAs have become the primary enforcers of Articles 101 & 102 TFEU. Some commentators have regarded the new enforcement system as a "major success, beyond expectations" 9 . Others have argued that Regulation 1/2003 "contained all the necessary tools to eliminate any concerns related to inconsistency" in the enforcement of substantive competition rules 10 . A comparison of the enforcement output of individual Member States reveals, however, a stark contrast in their enforcement levels. This enforcement gap is one of the reasons why the level playing field of EU competition law enforcement is far from being realized 11 . 6 D. Gerber, P. Cassinis, "The 'modernization' of European Community competition law: achieving consistency in enforcement: Part 1" (2006) Official statistics are indicative also of the Estonian contribution to decentralized enforcement of EU competition rules. During the reference period of 2004-2013, Estonia has notified seven investigations and three envisaged decisions 14 . These numbers place Estonian participation in EU competition law enforcement at a negligible 0.4% of the total number of investigations and envisaged decisions notified within the ECN. Estonia also stands amongst those Member States, which haven't notified even a single judgment pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation 1/2003. The above data shows that direct enforcement of EU competition rules in Estonia is virtually non-existent. Such preliminary conclusion stands in stark contrast with the substantive harmonisation of domestic competition rules with their EU equivalents, the continuous implementation of EU enforcement standards and the practices in the Estonian legal system. The present paper is an attempt to understand the factors that have precluded an effective enforcement of EU competition rules in Estonia. More specifically, it should provide a critical assessment on the specifics of the Estonian legal system 15 . It covers its substantive, procedural and institutional components that have precluded EU competition rules from penetrating domestic enforcement practice both at the level of the NCA and of the national judiciary. The ensuing sections shall present an overview of major features of Estonian competition legislation and its diverse procedural frameworks applicable to the enforcement of competition rules. While the paper was not intended as a comparative study, incentives derived from the Estonian experience could serve as a point of comparison for other EU Merimaa, S. Mandla, Commercial and Economic Law in Estonia, New York 2011, p. 148-160. jurisdictions that display a similar record in relation to the enforcement of EU competition rules.
II. National competition rules: substance and procedure
Early comments on the harmonization of Estonian competition rules with those of the EU noted that "there is hardly anything in EU competition law that has not found its way into the Estonian Competition Act, often even word for word" 16 . This early harmonization of substantive competition rules has signalled the intention of the Estonian state to follow the EU model in domestic competition enforcement 17 . The fact was questioned, however, whether the implementation of EU competition rules in 'new' Member States should take account of their local circumstances, such as the size of their economy, institutional enforcement capabilities and other factors 18 .
The national equivalents of Articles 101 & 102 TFEU have been incorporated into the Estonian Competition Act 19 , which has been in force since 2001 with the most recent amendments introduced in July 2013 20 . The respective provision of the Estonian Competition Act mirrors Article 101 TFEU, aside from addition of anti-competitive information exchanges to the list of prohibited multilateral practices 21 . The domestic prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position follows the structure of Article 102 TFEU adding the following to the exemplary list of abuses: forcing an undertaking to concentrate, to enter into an agreement which restricts competition, to engage in concerted practices or to adopt a decision together with the undertaking or another undertaking as well as; unjustified refusal to sell or buy goods 22 .
Prior to the 2 013 amendments 23 , the Estonian concept of "dominance" covered also undertakings with special or exclusive rights and undertakings in control of essential facilities 24 . According to the new rules, undertakings with special or exclusive rights are no longer automatically considered dominant and thus their special obligations have been abolished, except for the duty to keep separate accounting of their revenues and expenditures relating to each product or service 25 Competition rules laid down in the Competition Act apply to all sectors of the economy (except the labour market) 37 including the extraction of natural resources, the manufacture of goods, provision of services and sale and purchase of products and services 38 . They are applicable to "undertakings" determined under a functional approach related to the exercise of an economic activity: "a company, sole proprietor, any other person engaged in economic or professional activities, an association which is not a legal person, or a person acting in the interests of an undertaking" 39 . Following this approach, state, local governments, legal persons in public law and other persons performing administrative duties can be treated as undertakings if they participate in a goods market 40 . The agricultural sector is subject to Estonian competition rules only to the extent determined on the basis provided for in Article 42 TFEU 41 . The geographical scope of the application of domestic competition law extends beyond the territory of Estonia when acts or omissions committed on foreign soil have a restrictive effect within the national territory 42 .
Certain economic sectors are subject to market regulation and the relevant sector-specific legislation contains provisions aimed at the protection and promotion of competition in those sectors. For example, in telecommunications, relevant legislation addresses potential abuses of dominance by imposing a wide range of conduct obligations on undertakings with the 'Significant Market Power' status 43 . In the postal sector, the conduct of the universal postal service provider is placed under the supervision of the ECA's Communications Regulatory Division 44 . The Natural Gas Act 45 , also enforced by the ECA, imposes special obligations on the dominant gas undertaking. They include: the publication of the terms and conditions of gas sales and the principles of price setting; prohibition to refuse gas sales to a household customer if the latter so requests 46 . Sector specific rules applicable in the railway sector 47 allow infrastructure managers and railway undertakings to submit complaints to the ECA if they were treated "in a discriminatory or otherwise unfair manner in the approval of the notice concerning a railway network, distribution of capacity, organisation of the co-ordination procedure, declaration of capacity to be depleted 48 , preparation of a timetable or determination of user fees" 49 . 48 This is where the railway infrastructure company is unable, for technical reasons, to attribute railway capacity to the undertakings requesting it. 49 Railways Act, para 64 1 . 50 Competition Act (Konkurentsiseadus) (RT I 1993, 47, 642) . 51 Competition Act (Konkurentsiseadus) (RT I 1998, 30, 410) .
III. The Estonian Competition Authority: structure and powers
when the current Competition Act entered into force 52 . The ECB's structure reflected its workload: it contained three supervisory departments dealing with anti-competitive agreements and the abuses of a dominant position in various economic sectors as well as a merger control department supervising concentrations in all economic sectors 53 . Hence, the organisational structure and the powers of the ECB initially reflected those of the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission 54 . The Estonian NCA has experienced a major organisational reform in 2007. In order to increase the efficiency of domestic economic regulation, it was decided that the NCA should also perform the functions of a national regulatory authority in various economic sectors. This resulted in the fusion of the ECB with the Energy Market Inspectorate and with the Communication Board. As a result, the newly established ECA combined the functions of a competition authority with those of a market regulator in the energy, communications and railway sector. The ECA commenced its activities under the reformed structure on 1 January 2008. It included, at that point, three divisions: the Competition Division, the Communications Regulatory Division and the Railway and Energy Regulatory Division.
The year 2010 brought further structural shifts to the ECA, which included a change in the names of its organizational units and a partial re-allocation of tasks. The re-organised ECA assumed the following structure from November 2010: the Competition Division, the Railway and Communications Regulatory Division, and the Energy and Water Regulatory Division 55 . In 2012 the ECA was granted additional competences concerning the supervision of the aviation sector. This led to further re-organisation of its structure. The new tasks were absorbed by the Railway and Communications Regulatory Division, which was once more re-named into the Communications Regulatory Division (a name that reflects the primary subject of its current activities) 56 59 . The ECA must refuse to initiate an investigation if: (1) the application is clearly unjustified; (2) an action concerning the same matter has been filed with the European Commission or a decision of the Commission concerning the same matter has entered into force; (3) it is not possible to identify the applicant on the basis of the information contained in the submission 60 ; (4) the application contains deficiencies and the applicant has failed to eliminate them by the date set by the ECA 61 .
Under the rules of criminal procedure, the ECA has the status of an independent investigative body empowered to carry out a series of investigative pre-trial activities 62 . Thus, it has the power to commence a criminal investigation and an obligation to notify the Prosecutor's Office 63 . Since criminal prosecution demands substantial evidentiary support, the ECA has been invested with a wide range of investigatory powers and competences. It can request natural or legal persons, including state authorities, to provide information or explanations in writing 64 ; to submit materials requested by the ECA 65 ; or to summon natural persons to the ECA's premises to provide 58 The internal structure and organization of the ECA is regulated in the Statutes of the Estonian Competition Authority, Approved by Regulation No. 101 of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications of 17.12.2007 17.12. (RTL1 2007 17.12. , 97, 1628 , entered into force 1.01.2008. 59 Competition Act, Article 63 1 . 60 On the basis of a reasoned request from the person submitting the application, the name of the person may, by a decision of the ECA, be declared not to be subject to disclosure to other persons. Competition Act, Article 63 1 (3).
61 Ibid, para 63 2 (1). The 2010 amendments of the Penal Code have increased sanctions that can be imposed on legal persons for taking part in anti-competitive agreements to a maximum o 5% of annual turnover. The fine could reach up to 10%, and cannot be less than 5%, of the annual turnover, for hard-core cartels. Natural persons responsible for the involvement in a hard-core cartel will risk a pecuniary sanction or at least one year of imprisonment, which could be raised up to three years for hard-core cartels 73 .
In case of anti-competitive agreements, abuses of a dominant position, violations of merger control rules or any procedural provisions of the Competition Act (i.e. failure to supply the ECA with requested information, interference with dawn raids, failure to appear when summoned, etc.), the ECA can issue an order requiring the natural or legal person concerned to: 1) perform the act required by the order; 2) refrain from a prohibited act; 3) terminate or suspend activities which restrict competition; 4) restore the situation prior to the offence 74 76 . The term of such orders is up to three months (with the possibility of an extension by the ECA for up to one year). The ECA has also been authorised to accept commitments from undertakings suspected of a violation of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU (or their national equivalents) 77 . If the undertaking concerned fails to comply with such obligations, the ECA may now on its own initiative, or on the basis of an application of a 3 rd party, resume the infringement proceedings terminated upon the acceptance of the binding commitments 78 .
The ECA conducts the proceedings and imposes pecuniary penalties in relation to competition law violations treated by the Penal Code as misdemeanours: refusals to provide information or submission of false information (up to 300 fine units 79 for a natural person and up to EUR 3,200 for legal persons); abuse of a dominant position (up to 300 fine units for a natural person and up to EUR 32,000 for legal persons); implementation of a concentration without clearance (up to 300 fine units for a natural person and up to EUR 32,000 for legal persons); non-performance of obligations by undertakings in control of essential facilities (up to 300 fine units for a natural person and up to EUR 32,000 for legal persons); failure to comply with special requirements concerning accounting (up to 300 fine units for a natural person and up to EUR 32,000 for legal persons) 80 .
In the context of leniency, the authority of the ECA is very limited due to the fact that antitrust violations are criminalised and sanctioned in criminal procedure before the court. Under the relevant provisions of the Competition Act, the ECA must confirm the receipt of a leniency application and forward it to the Prosecutor's Office that heads the criminal prosecution 81 . 75 Ibid, para 62(3). 76 Ibid, para 63 6 . 77 Ibid, para 63 7 . 78 Ibid, para 63 7 (6). 79 A fine unit is a base amount of a fine and is equal to 4 EUR. Penal Code, para 47(1). 80 
IV. National judiciary: public and private enforcement of competition rules
The judicial review of the decisions issued by the ECA (administrative decisions establishing violations of Articles 101 & 102 TFEU and their national equivalents, orders issued to undertakings found in violation of competition rules, and misdemeanour procedures conducted by the ECA for the imposition of pecuniary penalties on undertakings found in violation of competition rules) falls under the competences of administrative courts.
Estonian administrative courts, the same as general jurisdiction courts, have a three-instance structure. Estonia has two administrative courts 82 (1 st instance), two circuit courts 83 (2 nd instance) and the Supreme Court 84 (3 rd and final instance). The administrative justice system is organised regionally, the 1 st and 2 nd instance courts are located in Estonia's two main cities: Tallinn and Tartu. Each of the two administrative courts is divided into two courthouses to facilitate access to the justice system by natural and legal persons. The review of judgments issued by administrative courts is exercised by the Tallinn Circuit Court 85 and Tartu Circuit Court 86 . The Supreme Court is located in Tartu. Its work is organised through chambers specialising in various legal areas: constitutional review, civil law, criminal law, administrative law.
The review of the decisions issued by the ECA is carried out by the competent courts pursuant to the rules contained in the Code of Administrative Court Procedure 87 . Infringement decisions on misdemeanours, delivered by the ECA in the capacity of an extra-judicial body, are reviewed by the competent courts pursuant to the rules contained in the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure 88 . Decisions of the ECA can be challenged, requesting an annulment, before the administrative court within thirty days of the date on which the decision was notified to the applicant 89 . An appeal against a judgment of the administrative court can be lodged before the circuit court within thirty days from the day on which the judgment was publicly pronounced 90 . A cassation request concerning 82 http://www.kohus.ee/en/estonian-court-system/administrative-courts (2.05.2014). 83 http://www.kohus.ee/en/estonian-court-system/circuit-courts (2.05.2014). 84 a judgment of the circuit court can be lodged before the Supreme Court within thirty days of the public pronouncement of the 2 nd instance judgment 91 . Preliminary proceedings are followed by a court session, which under normal circumstances should be held not earlier than thirty days from the date of the delivery of the action to the respondent 92 . Misdemeanour infringement decisions of the ECA can be appealed by the parties before the county court within fifteen days of the receipt of the contested decision 93 . An administrative review procedure results in a ruling on the legality of the decision issued by the ECA, which could be either upheld or annulled. The court will not engage in an exercise of its discretionary powers in place of the ECA -it will only rule on the legality of the administrative decision, it will not substitute the decision 94 .
Private enforcement of competition law in Estonia is not limited to follow-on actions -concerned parties can submit damages claims resulting from a violation of the Competition Act without the need of a decision from the ECA 95 . Parties should follow civil procedure for all claims for damages caused by acts prohibited by the Competition Act. Such damages claims should be litigated in general courts. The 1 st instance court decides the case on the merits, that is, it establishes the eligibility for damages and quantifies their amount. The court of 2 nd instance can uphold the original judgment, amend or annul it, in full or in part, and terminate the proceedings or send the judgment for a new hearing at the 1 st instance court 96 . The Supreme Court has similar authority in relation to cassation requests lodged against the judgments of the circuit courts 97 .
V. Enforcement of EU competition rules: influencing factors
In order to verify EU statistics on the enforcement of EU competition rules in Estonia, a search has been conducted for national infringement decisions and judgments involving the direct enforcement of Generally speaking, there are no significant barriers in Estonia when it comes to access to justice specific to competition law cases. According to the 2013 EU Justice Scoreboard 100 , the average duration of administrative cases in Estonia was between 100 and 200 days while litigious civil and commercial cases that cover follow-on claims lasted circa 200 days 101 . The above statistics demonstrates that the average duration of administrative cases in Estonia is far below the EU average. The use of the centralized electronic system "E-File", utilized for filing clams and monitoring the progress of the cases, makes it possible to save time and resources 102 .
The reasons for the absence of EU competition rules from the judgments of the Estonian courts should be considered in light of the specifics of the diverse underlying procedural frameworks. In criminal cases, charges are formulated by the Public Prosecutor on the basis of the offenses listed in the Penal Code. Abuses of a dominant position are prosecuted by the ECA under the procedural rules for misdemeanour. In administrative cases, courts review various procedural infringements committed by the investigated undertakings as well as the legality of the orders issued by the ECA which are meant to remedy the anti-competitive behaviour of the offender.
Researching the enforcement record of the ECA has not uncovered any infringement decisions based on direct application of EU competition rules. The ECA has a clearly defined priority to primarily pursue criminal enforcement of domestic competition rules, leading to the criminal prosecution of the offenders. For instance, in the ECA's annual report, the year 2012 was labelled as "the most successful year for judicial decisions" because the three criminal cases handled by the ECA that year have all ended in Private enforcement of competition rules in Estonia is virtually non-existent and competition-related damages claims are usually resolved in out-of-court settlements. A recent study on comparative private enforcement and consumer redress identified the following obstacles in relation to private enforcement of competition law in Estonia: (1) prevalence of out-of-court settlements; (2) unfamiliarity with competition law for Estonian judges, attorneys, in-house counsel; (3) high burden of proof associated with the demonstration and quantification of damages; (4) absence of collective redress mechanisms 104 . This closes another door for the penetration of EU competition rules into the Estonian legal system. Finally, domestic public opinion is hardly interested in the diversity and complexity of Estonia's procedural frameworks for the enforcement of competition rules. The attention of the media is normally focused on high impact cases that would demonstrate the existence of anti-competitive agreements among manufacturers or distributors of socially sensitive products such as food, household items, and utilities 105 . These considerations might divert the resources and public attention further away from the enforcement of EU competition rules.
VI. Conclusion
This paper does not claim to be exhaustive in listing the influencing factors that affect the enforcement of EU competition rules in Estonia, nor does it claim to provide a comprehensive explanation of the reasons for the absence of EU competition rules in domestic public and private enforcement. Yet several major obstacles should be highlighted. First, despite profound harmonization of substantive competition rules contained in the Estonian Competition Act, the national legislator has opted for a diversified procedural framework for their enforcement. Public enforcement of antitrust provisions is thus carried out through administrative, misdemeanour or criminal proceedings by the ECA and by the Public Prosecutor through courts. As a result, the choice of proceedings and thus the available remedies and sanctions largely depend on the ECA's discretion. According to the practitioners, this makes the outcomes of Estonian investigations and prosecutions less predictable 106 . Second, pursuing optimization of state resources, the Estonian Government has continuously expanded the competences of the ECA combining under the responsibility of a single administrative authority the functions of competition protection and market regulation. As a result, the ECA is responsible for antitrust enforcement, merger control, state aid control, the enforcement of unfair competition rules, and the regulation of energy, transport and telecommunications markets. As a result, limited human and financial resources are stretched over a wide variety of tasks. This in itself limits the probability of the ECA taking on demanding investigations into the violations of EU competition rules. Third, the virtually non-existent private enforcement of competition rules, and insufficient public attention vis-à-vis competition matters, further reduce the chances for EU competition rules to fall into the ambit of judicial proceedings in Estonia.
Divergence in procedural rules and institutional variations have been mentioned as important influencing factors that affect the enforcement of EU competition rules in various Member States 107 . These factors have led to a virtually complete exclusion of EU competition rules from the domestic legal system in Estonia. As a result, after a decade of decentralized EU competition law enforcement, Estonian judges, public officials, undertakings and their legal counsel have little, or no direct contact with EU competition rules.
